Technological developments have made it difficult and expensive to prepare for the next military conflict. The mindsets of the military leaders and defense contractors call for weapons of greater lethality and greater survivability. These goals, of course, lead to greater expense that results in the ability to pay for ever smaller numbers of weapons, which in turn leads to even greater emphasis on lethality and survivability, and even greater costs. This military, technological, political dance came face to face with an example of how the next war might be fought. When Russia invaded Ukraine some three years ago, it was interesting to note that a vast superiority in manpower, tanks, and other mechanized vehicles was of little value to the Russians. They were prepared for an easy victory, while the Ukrainians viewed the invasion as a more severe version of the war they had been fighting since 2014. Russia was forced to surrender many of its initial gains but were able to retreat to lines they could hold, and the battle became essentially a stalemate.
Then things got really interesting. Ukraine, at a material disadvantage in almost all areas, began to look into strategies that could be effective, but at little cost. Thus begins the battlefield use of surveillance and attack drones. It was discovered that a few small weaponized attack drones could be used to destroy tanks and other armored vehicles, and that those expensive beasts had little opportunity to go unobserved while in motion. Russia was forced to duplicate such tactics. Both sides compete for the slightest advantage with new systems being introduced in weeks or months. The battle line now comes with a kill zone where no one can be safe that extends for about ten miles. If the Russians wish to attack, they must span that space as quickly as possible without any vulnerable troop concentrations. Traditional military vehicles are too dangerous. Russia seems to have decided that individual motorcycles are the best bet for an attacking force.
Ukraine has also used relatively cheap marine drones to drive Russian warships away from its shores, another example of inexpensive technology putting at risk tremendously expensive assets.
One has to wonder what NATO forces think about these developments. Are the weapons in their warehouses rapidly becoming obsolete? Will NATO generals have to be taught how to wage war by the Ukrainians? Are defense contractors trying to figure out how to make billions of dollars manufacturing motorcycles?
Another area in which tactics have moved in an unexpected direction is air warfare. There are no tales of dogfights between jet pilots because neither side can afford to let its expensive jets cross into enemy territory because air defenses have become so effective. Fighter pilots launch missiles at the enemy from afar or they help provide defense against missiles and drones. Thus far there does not appear to be any cheap technology that could change this picture. The enemy’s planes are most at risk when they are on the ground. Both sides try to use missiles and drones, whatever is available, to take out planes they can reach. The Russians have had to move their planes further back into Russia or keep them in armored bunkers to protect them. As this article was being written, Ukraine demonstrated an audacious way to use inexpensive drones to destroy Russia’s advanced planes. More on that below.
The F-16s that took so long to migrate to Ukraine for use are considered fourth-generation planes. The US has already developed a fifth-generation plane, the F-35. That plane is a Lockheed Martin product whose development began in 1996. The contract for the company to produce the F-35 was signed in 2001. Full-rate production did not begin until 2021. It took over twenty years to go from concept to mass production. The world’s militaries seem poised to commit to producing sixth-generation fighters.
The Economist summarizes what is known of plans in the article The race to build the fighter planes of the future. The need for more advanced models is influenced by a number of factors, including fear of the performance of current air defense systems as experienced in the Ukraine-Russia conflict.
“One shift they all predict is more, and better, surface-to-air missile systems, a lesson reinforced by the strong performance of air defences in Ukraine. That requires more stealth to keep planes hidden from enemy radar. Stealth, in turn, requires smooth surfaces—bombs and missiles cannot hang off the wing, but must be tucked away inside a larger body.”
There are a number of developments underway, all indicating much larger structures to hold interior weapons, more fuel for longer range, and more complex electronics. The US entry is suspiciously named the F-47. More troubling is the award of the development contract to Boeing, which, of late, seems to have problems doing anything. Little is known of the F-47 except that it is expected to be much larger than either the F-35 or F-22.
“In December China showed off what was believed to be a prototype of the J-36, an imposing plane with stealthy features and a large flying-wing design. Britain, Italy and Japan are co-developing their own plane, in Britain provisionally called the Tempest, which is due to enter service in 2035. France, Germany and Spain hope that their Future Combat Air System (FCAS) will be ready by 2040. Together, these represent the future of aerial warfare.”
One reason why longer range is required is security for the planes when not in use.
“Finally, planes are especially vulnerable to long-range missiles when they are on the ground. That means they need to fly from more distant airfields, requiring larger fuel tanks and less drag for more efficient flight. The huge wings seen on the Tempest and the J-36 allow for both those things…Range is a particular concern for America. Its airbases in Japan are within reach of vast numbers of Chinese ballistic missiles. It plans to disperse its planes more widely in wartime and to fly them from more distant runways, such as those in Australia and on Pacific islands.”
Any strategy for development of expensive future aircraft must consider Ukraine’s most recent use of cheap drones. The Economist provides comments in the article An astonishing raid deep inside Russia rewrites the rules of war. The following lede is provided.
“Ukraine’s high-risk strikes damage over 40 top-secret strategic bombers”
Ukraine managed to get numerous small weaponized drones stationed near multiple Russian air bases on trucks. A mechanism could be activated to release the drones at the appropriate time and as first-person-view drones they could be controlled by operators in Ukraine. They were too small and too close in to be defended against. And it doesn’t take much to destroy an expensive plane.
“Today’s operation is likely to be ranked among the most important raiding actions in modern warfare. According to sources, the mission was 18 months in the making. Russia had been expecting attacks by larger fixed-wing drones at night and closer to the border with Ukraine. The Ukrainians reversed all three variables, launching small drones during the day, and doing so far from the front lines.”
“Commentators close to the Ukrainian security services suggest that as many as 150 drones and 300 bombs had been smuggled into Russia for the operations. The quadcopters were apparently built into wooden cabins, loaded onto lorries and then released after the roofs of the cabins were remotely retracted. The drones used Russian mobile-telephone networks to relay their footage back to Ukraine, much of which was released by the gleeful Ukrainians.”
So, Ukraine did figure out a way to take out troublesome enemy planes and it really did not cost much, and did not require any exotic technologies either. There is a lesson in this event for all those who wish to build ever more expensive aircraft.
“Western armed forces are watching closely. For many years they have concentrated their own aircraft at an ever smaller number of air bases, to save money, and have failed to invest in hardened hangars or shelters that could protect against drones and missiles. America’s own strategic bombers are visible in public satellite imagery, sitting in the open. ‘Imagine, on game-day,’ writes Tom Shugart of CNAS, a think-tank in Washington, ‘containers at railyards, on Chinese-owned container ships in port or offshore, on trucks parked at random properties…spewing forth thousands of drones that sally forth and at least mission-kill the crown jewels of the [US Air Force].’ That, he warns, would be ‘entirely feasible’.”
Perhaps people should learn how to protect the assets
they already have before spending a fortune and a decade or two on new assets.