China’s Plan for the World’s Future

 China is a powerhouse.  It is a major contributor to the world economy, it is politically active across the globe, and it continues to grow its military capabilities.  Many nations worry about its short-term objectives as well as its long-term goals.  China has made it clear that they deserve to be the example for other countries, and they wish to be a major influence in world affairs.  The issue is the role other countries might play in a China-dominated world.  Elizabeth Economy takes a shot at addressing these concerns in a Foreign Affairs article: China’s Alternative Order: And What America Should Learn From It.

“By now, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambition to remake the world is undeniable. He wants to dissolve Washington’s network of alliances and purge what he dismisses as ‘Western’ values from international bodies. He wants to knock the U.S. dollar off its pedestal and eliminate Washington’s chokehold over critical technology. In his new multipolar order, global institutions and norms will be underpinned by Chinese notions of common security and economic development, Chinese values of state-determined political rights, and Chinese technology. China will no longer have to fight for leadership. Its centrality will be guaranteed.”

Many of the alliances Xi is disturbed by are alliances that are formed to protect members from Xi’s goals.  And the “Western” values include basic human rights and democracy.  His goal is to make the international community more welcoming to autocrats, dictators, and fascists.  Apparently, “Chinese” values will be propagated by military and economic dominance.

“To hear Xi tell it, this world is within reach. At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs last December, he boasted that Beijing was (in the words of a government press release) a ‘confident, self-reliant, open and inclusive major country,’ one that had created the world’s ‘largest platform for international cooperation’ and led the way in ‘reforming the international system.’ He asserted that his conception for the global order—a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’—had evolved from a ‘Chinese initiative’ to an ‘international consensus,’ to be realized through the implementation of four Chinese programs: the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative.”

This statement seriously overhypes Xi’s successes, but he has had some.  Those who are in favor of the status quo or who feel threatened by China are forming collaborations to protect themselves.  Those who are dissatisfied with the status quo or who favor nondemocratic governance have begun to express interest in China’s initiatives.

The author warns the US and its allies that China must be taken seriously, and its activities should be countered by constructive initiatives. 

“Rather than dismissing Beijing’s playbook, U.S. policymakers should learn from it. To win what will be a long-term competition, the United States must seize the mantle of change that China has claimed. Washington needs to articulate and push forward its own vision for a transformed international system and the U.S. role within that system—one that is inclusive of countries at different economic levels and with different political systems.”

There are two ways to approach China and its activities.  China is either a competitor who plays according to international norms, or it is an enemy who feels no need to play by any rules but its own.  Economy seems to believe competition with China can be conducted safely and productively.  There are others who view China as a potential existential threat.  Consider the views expressed by Michael Pillsbury in his book The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower.

Pillsbury has had long experience in dealing with the Chinese.  He also has the ability to read the things they write to each other, rather than just what gets translated for international discussion.  China’s hundred-year plan is driven by the desire for revenge against those who mistreated it during the colonial era, and the desire to regain its position as the center of civilization on Earth.

“…they see a multipolar world as merely a strategic waypoint en route to a new global hierarchy in which China is alone at the top.  The Chinese term for this new order is da tong, often mistranslated by Western scholars as ‘commonwealth,’ or ‘an era of harmony.’  However, da tong is better translated as ‘an era of unipolar dominance.’  Since 2005, Chinese leaders have spoken at the United Nations and other public forums of their supposed vision of this kind of harmonious world.”

“For example, Zhao Tingyang’s The Under-Heaven System: The Philosophy of World Institution was published in 2005 and is gaining increasing currency in mainline Chinese thought today.  Zhao’s ‘system’ redesigns global structures based on traditional Chinese ideals.  That new world is called tianxia, which in Mandarin can be translated as ‘under-heaven,’ ‘empire,’ and ‘China.’  The China scholar William A. Callahan translates tianxia as a unified global system with China’s ‘superior’ civilization at the top.  Other civilizations, such as the United States, are part of the ‘barbarian wilderness.’  As the center of the civilized world, China would have the responsibility to ‘improve’ all the nations and peoples of the world by ‘harmonizing’ them—spreading Chinese values, language, and culture so they can better fit into under-heaven.  This empire ‘values order over freedom, ethics over law, and elite governance over democracy and human rights’.”

That author made it clear to Pillsbury that to sustain such a system, China would have to possess overwhelming military might such that there could be no possibility of contesting China’s mandates.

If one wishes to compete with someone, one had better understand who one is dealing with, and what the real rules of competition are going to be.  With China, we are not there yet.