The United States has accumulated many responsibilities across
the globe requiring them to come to the aid of various countries should they be
attacked. The biggest commitment is to
NATO to protect its member nations in case of a military assault. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was deemed of
sufficient threat to NATO countries that Ukraine is supported by NATO nations as
it fights to maintain its existence.
This is a proxy war for the US, providing monetary and military
resources, along with other nations, to keep Ukraine’s hopes alive. Putin has already let Europe know that
Ukraine is not its only target. The US
was also drawn into the Israeli conflict with Hamas, with Israel receiving military
and economic aid, as well as occasional US battlefield assistance. This activity is also seen as a proxy war
between Iran and Israel (and Israel’s allies).
The US has a long-standing commitment to come to the aid of South Korea
if the North decides to provoke military action. North Korea is constantly reminding the world
of its growing military capabilities.
The least understood commitment is the one the US has for the island
nation of Taiwan. The potential opponent
related to that nation is China.
Interestingly, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea act as if they have
a formal alliance to wrest world domination from the US and its allied
democracies. They support each other
militarily and economically. Two of the
four members have fomented serious military conflict in different parts of the
globe. Could there be a third coming…or
a fourth?
When Chaing Kai-shek lost the civil war with the
communists after World War II, he, his army, and supporters withdrew to the
island of Formosa. His hope was always
to reconquer the mainland. The US became
involved when Mao threatened military action.
Eisenhower came to Chiang’s support because foiling the assault of a noncommunist
country by a communist country is what the US did in that era. Nixon and Kissinger, in the 1970s wanted to
establish relations with China and signed documentation stating that there was
only one China and that included Taiwan.
At the time Chaing was still alive and continued to believe that he
deserved to be the leader of that one China.
The One China Policy became more convoluted when Taiwan, relieved
finally from Chaing’s rule, became a democracy and began claiming its right to
independence.
The US was in the position of needing to protect a
noncommunist country from a communist country while still claiming it adhered
to the One China Policy. This awkward
stance continued for some time as Mao’s successors seemed to have other things
to worry about. That changed when Xi
Jinping came to power. He made “unification”
with Taiwan critical to his China and has threatened to use force to make it
happen. President Biden has also changed
policy by claiming that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if it was
attacked.
Why have China and the US both drastically altered their
policies toward Taiwan? Little Taiwan is
big Taiwan when it comes to economic prowess.
It developed unmatched capabilities at producing advanced semiconductor
chips. It became China’s leading trading
partner and has world economies trembling should its chip fabrication assets be
threatened by anything. Chris Miller
provides a highly interesting history in his book , explaining how Taiwan attained such
economic power.
The development of semiconductor chips that could replace
bulky and power-hungry electrical circuits provided a turning point in human
civilization. At first, the defense
industries jumped at the opportunity to combine explosive power with computing
power great enough to provide guidance for more precise targeting. The race was on to produce integrated
circuits that could provide complex calculations with minimum space, weight,
and power demands. As these complex
circuits became smaller and cheaper the market drivers became consumer
products.
“…semiconductors are embedded in
every device that requires computing power—and in the age of
the Internet of Things, this means pretty much every device. Even hundred-year-old products like
automobiles now often include a thousand dollars worth of chips. Most of the world’s GDP is produced with
devices that rely on semiconductors. For
a product that didn’t exist seventy-five years ago, this is an extraordinary
ascent.”
The desire for smaller and more powerful chips drove more
complex and expensive technology development.
Early companies tried to control the entire process: designing chips and
fabricating them. Soon the expense of
new developments became so great that only a few large companies could maintain
this model, while others settled into niches that could continue to be
profitable. The extreme expense of
technology development led to a necessary monopolization of capabilities.
“In the age of AI (artificial
intelligence), it’s often said that data is the new oil. Yet the real limitation we face isn’t the
availability of data but of processing power.
There’s a finite number of semiconductors that can store and process
data. Producing them is mind-bogglingly
complex and horrendously expensive.
Unlike oil, which can be bought from many countries, our production of
computing power depends fundamentally on a series of choke points: tools, chemicals,
and software that often are produced by a handful of companies—and
sometimes only by one. No other facet of
the economy is so dependent on so few firms.
Chips from Taiwan provide 37 percent of the world’s new computing power
each year. Two Korean companies produce
44 percent of the world’s memory chips.
The Dutch company ASML builds 100 percent of the world’s extreme ultraviolet
lithography machines, without which cutting-edge chips are simply impossible to
make. OPEC’s 40 percent share of world
oil production looks unimpressive by comparison.”
A paucity of sources for cutting-edge products puts
supply chains for major goods at risk.
Consider Apple and its iPhone suppliers and understand why Taiwan is so
important to the global economy.
“For the past decade, each
generation of iPhone has been powered by one of the world’s most advanced
processor chips. In total, it takes over
a dozen semiconductors to make a smartphone work, with different chips managing
the battery, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular network connections, audio, the camera,
and more.”
“Apple makes precisely none
of these chips. It buys most
off-the-shelf: memory chips from Japan’s Kioxia, radio frequency chips from
California’s Skyworks, audio chips from Cirrus Logic, based in Austin, Texas. Apple designs in-house the ultra-complex
processors that run an iPhone’s operating system. But the Cupertino, California’s colossus can’t
manufacture these chips. Nor can any
company in the United States, Europe, Japan, or China. Today, Apple’s most advanced processors—which
are arguably the world’s most advanced semiconductors—can only be produced
by a single company in a single building, the most expensive factory in human
history…”
“Today, no firm fabricates chips
with more precision than the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, better
known as TSMC.”
So, China is threatening an invasion of Taiwan. Is that because it yearns for a single China or
is it because it covets Taiwan’s assets?
Whatever the reason, it is unlikely that China would risk destroying
TSMC’s facilities.
“After a disaster in Taiwan, in
other words, the total costs would be measured in the trillions. Losing 37 percent of our production of
computing power each year could well be more costly than the COVID pandemic and
its economically disastrous lockdowns.
It would take at least half a decade to rebuild the lost chipmaking
capacity. These days when we look five
years out we hope to be building 5G networks and metaverses, but if Taiwan were
taken offline we might find ourselves struggling to acquire dishwashers.”
Given its avowed goal of becoming the dominant economic
power in the world, China would certainly wish to have control of Taiwan’s chip
fabrication capabilities. Meanwhile the
US and other nations would be willing to take drastic steps to see that does
not happen.
“If China were to succeed in
pressuring Taiwan into giving Beijing equal access—or even preferential
access—to TSMC’s fabs, the U.S. and Japan would surely respond by
placing new limits on the export of advanced machinery and materials, which
largely come from these two countries and their European allies. But it would take years to replicate Taiwan’s
chip making capacity in other countries, and in the meantime we’d still depend
on Taiwan. If so, we would find
ourselves not only reliant on China to assemble our iPhones. Beijing could conceivably gain influence over
the only fabs with the technological capability and production capacity to
churn out the chips we depend on.”
This discussion should provoke some thoughts about how
far nations like the US should go in discouraging any attempt by China to
control Taiwan. The US and the world
have an economic interest at stake.
The world’s dependence on Taiwan justifies the
legislation passed by the US, “Chips for America.” This is a collection of programs designed to
move some of the chip fabrication capability of Samsung and TSMC to plants in
the US. It would also support Intel in
competing with Samsung and TSMC as a foundry making the next generation of
advanced chips for other users. Let us
thank good old Joe for that one.
To those with an interest in chip technology and the
history of the industry, I heartily recommend “Chip War” by Chris Miller. He has an exciting story to tell, and he
tells it well. I felt like I was reading
downhill, faster and faster.